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NOTES
CONTRACTS-THE TREND TOWARD LEGAL REALISM. Shearson
Lehman CMO, Inc. v. TCF Banking & Savings, 710 F. Supp. 67
(S.D.N.Y. 1989). Teachers Insurance & Annuity Association v. Trib-
une Co., 670 F. Supp. 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
Shearson Lehman CMO, Inc. (hereinafter Shearson), a subsidiary
of Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., purchases mortgage backed certifi-
cates guaranteed by various federal agencies. Government agencies cre-
ate the certificates by purchasing mortgages from lenders' and then
selling the right to the cash flow from a small portion of these mort-
gages. The certificates themselves are secured by the mortgages, while
the mortgages are secured by the actual properties.2 Shearson finances
these transactions by selling collateralized mortgage obligations
(CMOs) secured by the mortgage certificates.3
On March 5, 1987, TCF Banking and Savings (hereinafter TCF)
and Shearson reached an agreement whereby TCF would buy 49 % of
the residual interest in a CMO trust." A specific internal rate of return
and the formula for calculating such rate of return on the bonds was
agreed to by both TCF and Shearson. Soon after, Shearson sent TCF a
mockup of a financial advertisement describing the purchase. 5 TCF
1. Shearson Lehman CMO, Inc. v. TCF Banking & Say., 710 F. Supp. 67 (S.D.N.Y.
1989). The lenders consist of such institutions as commercial banks or savings and loan institu-
tions. Id. at 69.
2. id.
3. Id. The court provided the following explanation:
CMOs convey the right to obtain a portion of the cash flow from a pool of mortgage
backed certificates. The CMOs issued to buy a specific group of mortgage backed cer-
tificates are referred to collectively as a CMO trust, and usually last for a specific
period of time . . . . However, the cash flow from a given pool of mortgage backed
certificates often is well in excess of what is required to pay off the CMO holders. What
is left over is called the residual cash flow. A CMO residual is simply the right to
receive that excess cash flow over the life of the CMO trust.
Id.
4. Id. The particular trust TCF invested in consisted of Shearson Mortgage Backed Sequen-
tial Pay Bonds known as Series G CMO residuals. Id.
5. A mockup is also known as a tombstone ad which is merely an announcement of a stock
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changed three words in the mockup and returned the advertisement to
Shearson. In addition, Shearson sent TCF a draft private placement
memorandum6 and purchase agreement. After TCF reviewed the
drafts, TCF discovered the deal with Shearson would result in various
unforeseen tax and accounting problems. As a result of these problems,
TCF refused to buy the residuals. 7
As a result of TCF's refusal to perform, Shearson sued for breach
of contract. Shearson alleged that its March 5, 1987 conversation with
TCF constituted a valid oral agreement. Shearson also asserted promis-
sory estoppel to prevent TCF from denying the existence of a contract. 8
In granting TCF's motion for summary judgment, the district court
determined that the parties never considered the March 5, 1987 con-
versation to be an oral contract. 9 In addition, the court rejected Shear-
son's promissory estoppel claim by finding that TCF's promise to
purchase 49 % of the CMO residuals was unclear and ambiguous."l
Shearson Lehman CMO, Inc. v. TCF Banking & Savings, 710 F.
Supp. 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association (hereinafter Teach-
ers) is an organization which furnishes pension annuities and insurance
programs to educational institutions. Tribune Company (hereinafter
Tribune) is a communications conglomerate that owned the New York
Daily News. 1 In the spring of 1982, Tribune decided to restructure its
News subsidiary. As a result, Tribune acquired a nonrecurring tax loss
of $75 million.12 Therefore, Tribune decided to sell the News Building.
Tribune felt it imperative to sell the building in 1982 so that the loss
realized from the restructuring could be offset against the taxable gain
realized from the sale of the building. 13
In anticipation of selling the News Building, Tribune circulated an
offering. It is not used as a selling tool. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1334 (5th ed. 1979).
6. 710 F. Supp. at 69. The private placement memo was sent pursuant to § 4(2) Securities
Exchange Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(d)(2)(1982). A private placement memorandum is a mem-
orandum in which a corporation offers to sell its stock to private persons outside of a public offer-
ing. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1076 (5th ed. 1979).
7. 710 F. Supp. at 69.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 73.
10. Id. at 74.
11. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n v. Tribune Co., 670 F. Supp. 491, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
12. Id. at 492. The important feature of Tribune's proposal was the idea of offset account-
ing whereby Tribune would have the loss from restructuring the company offset from the gain of
selling the building. Id.
13. Id.
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offering brochure to potential investors.14 Teachers was one of the in-
vestors who received Tribune's brochure. Discussions ensued between
Tribune and Teachers in which both parties made clear their expecta-
tions. Tribune emphasized its need for offset accounting and a firm
commitment by September 15, 1982."5
On September 16, 1982, Tribune was told that Teacher's Finance
Committee met and discussed the purchase of the building on the
terms outlined in the offering brochure.' 6 The Committee approved the
purchase and informed Teachers it would soon receive a commitment
letter. The draft of the letter and a two page term sheet was mailed on
September 22.1 The term sheet outlined the fundamental economic
terms of the loan as covered in Tribune's proposal; however, neither the
term sheet nor the commitment letter reflected Tribune's requirement
of offset accounting. 8 The letter stated that once Teachers received an
accepted counterpart of the commitment letter, a binding agreement
between the two parties would be formed. 19 When Tribune received the
letter with the binding language, its lawyers advised against signing the
documents. However, Tribune had been turned down by five other in-
stitutions and did not want to lose the commitment. 20
Tribune's board of directors met on October 28. At this meeting,
the board adopted resolutions authorizing the proper officers of the
company to execute the loan.2' In November, Tribune's accountants
14. Id. at 493. The brochure consisted of 50 pages describing the proposed mortgage and
loan on the building along with pertinent financial information on the Tribune and the building.
"The brochure included two term sheets-one describing the proposed money purchase money
mortgage Tribune would receive upon the sale of the Building, the other giving the terms of the
proposed match-fund borrowing." Id. The match fund would occur when Tribune borrowed from
a third party an amount approximately equal to the mortgage note. Id. at 492.
15. Id. at 493. Teachers informed Tribune there could be no firm commitment before ap-
proval of the deal by Teacher's Finance Committee which would not meet until September 16.
Tribune accepted the delay. Id.
16. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
17. 670 F. Supp. at 494. The draft of the letter included a two page summary of the pro-
posed terms drawn from the term sheet included in Tribune's offering brochure and the ensuing
conversations between Tribune and Teachers. Id.
18. Id. In essence, the letter stated the agreement was dependent on preparation, execution,
and delivery of documents satisfactory to Teachers and Teachers' counsel. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. Tribune signed the letter without commenting on the absence of offset accounting.
However, Tribune sent an accompanying letter to Teachers in which it stated acceptance was
conditional on approval by the Tribune's board of directors and the preparation of satisfactory
legal documentation of the deal. Id.
21. Id. at 495. The resolutions also stated that the actual terms and conditions of the agree-
ment were subject to prior approval by a resolution of the Finance Committee. Id.
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became concerned about the offset accounting issue.2" Teachers and
Tribune held meetings and negotiations regarding the concerns of offset
accounting.2 3 Meanwhile, interest rates quickly fell below those rates
effective in August when Teachers and Tribune entered into the com-
mitment.2 Nonetheless, Tribune executed and returned the loan
documents. 25
In late October 1982, Teachers informed Tribune that its Board
had given general approval to the transaction. 26 Around December 2,
Tribune began making various changes to the transaction including
making the deal conditional on offset accounting. However, Teachers
would not agree to the proposal. On December 6, Teachers pressured
Tribune to finalize the loan documents. Teachers also asked Tribune to
have a meeting to work out the open terms. 7 Tribune responded that
without the availability of offset accounting, there was no point in ne-
gotiating further. 28 In response, Teachers sent Tribune a letter ex-
tending the commitment for thirty days. However, Tribune exhibited
no further interest in pursuing the transaction.29 Teachers brought this
action against Tribune charging Tribune with breach of their commit-
ment agreement for a fourteen year $76 million loan. 30
The district court held that the commitment letter represented a
binding preliminary agreement. 31 The agreement obligated both parties
to try to reach a final loan agreement including terms already agreed
upon, while negotiating in good faith to resolve the minor additional
22. Id. In mid-October, the Financial Accounting Standards Board issued an exposure draft
discussing the appropriateness of offset accounting. Tribune's accountants also became concerned
that if Tribune proceeded to offer securities to the public, the SEC in commenting on the Regis-
tration Statement might ask the accountants for an opinion on the "preferability" of offset ac-
counting. The accountants did not feel they could give such an opinion. Without such an opinion,
the SEC might not allow the liability to be kept off the balance sheet. Id.
23. Id. at 495-96.
24. Id. at 496.
25. Id. at 495. Tribune added to the letter that the commitment was subject to modifica-
tions set out in the accompanying letter. The modifications consisted of the acceptance being sub-
ject to the right of approval by Tribune's Board of Directors. The acceptance letter did not men-
tion offset accounting. Id.
26. Id. at 496.
27. Id. The open terms consisted of relatively minor economic significance, i.e. events of




31. Id. at 499.
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terms which are "usual and customary" in the industry. 2 Moreover,
Tribune's reservation of right of approval to its board of directors did
not leave it free to abandon the transaction.33 Teachers Insurance &
Annuity Association v. Tribune Co., 670 F. Supp. 491 (S.D.N.Y.
1987).
A fundamental concept of contract law was well expressed by Jus-
tice Learned Hand in National City Bank v. Hotchkiss. 4 Hand stated
that "the secret intentions of a contracting party, even when attested to
by 20 bishops, will not be given force in a contract." 35 The common
law of contracts assumes a clear distinction between "contracts" and
"negotiations of a contract. ' 36 The distinction lies in the fact that
under a contract, each party has an enforceable right against the
other.3 7 "The person who becomes a party to a contract assumes a duty
to go forward with the contemplated transaction." 38 The contractor's
freedom of action is restrained in that if he does not go forward with
the contract, he could be guilty of a breach. 39 Therefore, until a con-
tract is reached, no rights exist because none have been created, and
neither party has a duty to go forward with the contract."
The outcome of a contract negotiation situation under the tradi-
tional common law categories leaves only two results: either a contract
was formed or a contract was niot formed. "' Under the traditional anal-
ysis, there is no room for preliminary binding agreements.4 2
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Shearson Lehman CMO, Inc., 710 F. Supp. at 70 (citing National City Bank v. Hotch-
kiss, 231 U.S. 50 (1913)).
35. Id.
36. Knapp, Enforcing the Contract to Bargain, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 673, 676 (1969).
37. Id.
38. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
39. Knapp, supra note 36, at 676. The duty to go forward could be inchoate or it could be
dependent on initial performance of the other party. Once the duty to go forward exists, the
contractor is no longer free to abandon the contract. In essence, even a statement of intention to
abandon the contract may amount to an immediate breach. Id.
In contrast, a party who is not bound by a duty to perform the contract may abandon the
proposed transaction at any time and for any reason. An unbound party remains free to enter into
another contract of a similiar nature with a third party, or refrain from action altogether. Either
way, the unbound party is not accountable to the abandoned party for any disappointment of
expectation. Knapp, supra note 36, at 676.
40. Knapp, supra note 36, at 676.
41. Knapp, supra note 36, at 676.
42. Knapp, supra note 36 at 676-77. However, there is a great likelihood that many situa-
tions would arise where the parties' obligations would fall in between the two extremes at some
stage of the negotiation. Knapp, supra note 36, at 676.
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However, carved into the rigid rules of common law is the concept
of "legal realism."43 Legal realism allows the court to examine the par-
ties' "moral" or "ethical" conduct with respect to the transaction at
issue."" In essence, legal realism provides a middle ground between the
stringent common law categories of contract and no-contract."5
Legal realism weakens the rigid common law rule that a binding
agreement between parties to a prospective transaction can exist only if
there are reciprocal rights and duties."' The best example of legal real-
ism slowly chipping away at traditional contract law is the Uniform
Commercial Code (U.C.C.). 47 The U.C.C. represents the trend toward
following the normal customs of conduct between businessmen in the
marketplace and looking at the reality of the business transaction.48
43. Knapp, supra note 36, at 675.
44. Knapp, supra note 36 at 675.
45. Knapp, supra note 36, at 675. The middle ground situations could potentially fall into
two categories: agreement to agree or formal contract contemplated. There is significant evidence
suggesting that old contract doctrines have been utterly useless to commercial life in this country
since the Civil War. Mooney, Commercial Law Jurisprudence, 11 VILL. L. REv. 213, 254 (1966).
A study conducted by Professor Stewart Macaulay suggests that the business world fears and
distrusts both contract law and lawyers. As a result, contract law is seldom used by the business
world. Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 55 AM. Soc.
REV. 60, 61-65 (1963). Macaulay suggests that businessmen prefer to make contracts by relying
on a "man's word in a brief letter, a handshake, or 'common honesty and decency,' even when the
transaction involves 'legally enforceable contracts.'" Id. This preference includes the sentiment
that commitments should be honored in full because a good businessman does not welsh on a deal
or a product. Id. The common belief of some businessmen is that legalistic contracts do not allow
for "flexibility" in dispute settlements. In fact, businessmen invoke the law of contracts as a last
resort. Id.
46. Knapp, supra note 36, at 676.
47. Knapp, supra note 36, at 678. The U.C.C. has been called "the most authoritative
statement of current American commercial law."
48. Knapp, supra note 36, at 678-79. One commentator suggests that if the U.C.C. was
expanded to cover business transactions, it would help solve the various business contract problems
that frequently arise in business dealings. Project, The U.C.C. and Contractual Law; Some Se-
lected Problems, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 836, 921 (1957). In addition, another author proposes that
commercial law in this country is or will be the U.C.C. since it firmly grounds itself in the real life
situations of business agreements. Mooney, Commercial Law Jurisprudence, 11 VILL. L. REv.
213, 220 (1966). The modern trend of enforcing business contracts must be grounded in the ac-
tual scenarios of modern economy, which depends heavily on credit transactions, and on transac-
tions which are continuous by nature (e.g., vendor/vendee and stockbroker/client). The U.C.C.
envisions such a modern approach to business transactions. Id. at 231.
"The traditional theory of contract will not hold up to the combined effect of the U.C.C. and
an increasing awareness in society of the gap between contract theory and the reality of the socio-
economic workings of our industrial democracy." Id. at 253. "The U.C.C. may not bridge the gap
in one swoop. However, the U.C.C. rests in a threshold position between the traditional doctrine of
contract and new jurisprudence and represents the essence of the legal realist movement in Ameri-
can law." Id. at 254.
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Another example of legal realism replacing the traditional doctrine of
contracts is the modern law of products liability.' 9 Products liability
principles developed out of a need of the modern consumer economy
which was crippled by the orthodox doctrine of privity.5
The modern view of precontractual liability centers around inten-
tions of the parties to enter into an agreement, rather than the actual
existence of an agreement.5 1 The courts focus on the oral or written
agreement between the parties and then on the parties' subsequent ac-
tions to ascertain the parties' intentions .5  As a result, the courts are
following a modern trend of softening traditional rules by looking at
reality rather than the form of transaction.5 3 Orthodox contract princi-
ples have developed into rules with emphasis on intent rather than
form.5 ' As preliminary agreements become the norm for many busi-
nesses, courts must solve the variety of problems that result when one
party relied on a preliminary agreement, while the other party had no
intention of being bound by such agreement. 5
Contractual liability arises from consent to be bound.56 Funda-
mental to contract law is the rule that participation in negotiation does
not give rise to a binding obligation.5 7 However, the courts should en-
force and preserve agreements where the parties intended a binding
agreement even though the agreement requires further documentation
or negotiation. 8 The key to determining when and whether a contract
49. Mooney, supra note 45, at 255. Product liability law developed from a blend of contract
and tort law.
50. Mooney, supra note 45, at 255. Other examples of the invasion of legal realism into the
modern society include collective bargaining agreements, pension and retirement plans, securities
marketing systems, and private-law making contracts. The traditional theory of contracts seems to
ignore the importance of $80 billion in pension funds, the realities of a corporate equities distribu-
tion and exchange system involving millions of dollars daily. The traditional law cannot be taken
seriously when evidence indicates that it is not only unnecessary but also dysfunctional.
51. Lake, Letters of Intent: A Comparative Examination Under English, U.S., French, and
West German Law, 18 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L & ECON. 331, 338 (1984).
52. Id.
53. See infra note 67 and accompanying text. The cases therein exemplify how the courts
took each fact situation on its own merits and evaluated the transaction in light of the reality of
the transaction.
54. V'soske v. Barwick, 404 F.2d 495, 499 (2d Cir. 1968).
55. C. KAUFMAN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § I (Supp. 1989).
56. New York law on contract negotiations holds that enforceable legal rights do not arise
until there is an expression of mutual consent to be bound or something to the equivalent to
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is formed is examining the parties' intentions.59 The threshold question
is whether the parties intended not to be bound prior to execution of a
formal contract, or whether they contemplated that their informal
agreement would be memorialized in writing at some future time.60
Under modern contract law, there are two types of preliminary
agreements with binding force.61 The first type of enforceable agree-
ment involves a situation in which the parties have reached complete
agreement (including the agreement to be bound) on all issues requir-
ing negotiation.62 This type of agreement, known as a "formal contract
contemplated," 63 is preliminary in form only in the sense that the par-
ties want a formalization of the agreement. However, the formalization
is not necessary-only desirable.6
Historically, the courts considered various factors, derived from a
melting pot of case law, in deciding whether parties intended to be
bound.6 5 Eventually, the courts developed a four-part test to aid in de-
termining the parties' intentions:66 (1) whether there has been an ex-
press reservation of the right not to be bound in the absence of writ-
ing; 7 (2) whether there has been partial performance of the contract
59. See infra note 73 and accompanying text. Winston v. Mediafare Entertainment Corp.,
777 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1985); R.G. Group, Inc. v. Horn & Hardart Co., 751 F.2d 69 (2d Cir.
1984); Chrysler Capital Corp. v. Southeast Hotel Properties Ltd. Partnership, 697 F. Supp. 794
(S.D.N.Y. 1988).
60. See supra note 59.
61. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 670 F. Supp. at 498. Knapp, supra note 36, at 676.
62. 670 F. Supp. at 498. A preliminary agreement can simply be an agreement to be bound
by such agreement. Id.
63. Knapp, supra note 36, at 676. Formal contract contemplated defines a situation in
which the parties have reached full agreement on many or most of the terms of the contemplated
transaction. In addition, the parties may desire a formalization of their agreement. However, the
formalization is not a prerequisite to making the preliminary agreement enforceable. 670 F.
Supp. at 498.
64. 670 F. Supp. at 498. Formalization may be desirable if the parties later want a written
agreement paralleling their preliminary agreement. However, the absence of a written agreement
would not mike the preliminary agreement any less enforceable. Id.
65. Banking and Trading Corp. v. Floete, 257 F.2d 765, 769 (2d Cir. 1958). The court
considered:
[W]hether the contract is of that class which are usually found to be in writing,
whether it is of such a nature as to need a formal writing for its full expression, whether
it has few or many details, whether the amount involved is large or small, whether it is
a common or unusual contract, [and) whether the negotiations themselves indicate that
a written draft is contemplated as the final conclusion of the negoitations.
Id.
66. R.G. Group, Inc., 751 F.2d at 75-76; Winston, 777 F.2d at 80-84; Chrysler Capital
Corp., 697 F. Supp. at 800-03.
67. R.G. Group, Inc., 751 F.2d at 75-76; Winston, 777 F.2d at 81-84; Chrysler Capital
256
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and acceptance of the performance by the party disclaiming the con-
tract; 8 (3) whether all of the terms of the alleged contract have been
agreed upon; 9 and (4) whether the agreement at issue is the type of
contract that is usually committed to writing."'
Corp., 697 F. Supp. at 801-03. Courts consider this a clear signal of the parties' intentions. A
party can make a statement not to be bound at any time during the course of bargaining or even
at the time of the alleged agreement. R.G. Group, Inc., 751 F.2d at 75 (The court found there was
a clear understanding between the parties that they intended to be bound only by written agree-
ment where the explicit wording of the franchise agreement declared on its face that when exe-
cuted, the agreement would set forth the parties' rights and obligations, and any modification of
the agreement would have to be written and signed). See ABC Trading Co. v. Westinghouse Elec.
Supply Co., 382 F. Supp. 600, 602 (Court rejected an alleged oral agreement because an earlier
letter from one of the parties said that if the client finds the proposal agreeable in principle, they
could proceed to reduce it to writing.); Chromalloy Am. Corp. v. Universal Hous. Sys. of Am.,
Inc., 495 F. Supp. 544, 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (Court found no oral contract under New York law
when "correspondance between the parties not only refers to a written agreement, but expressly
disclaims -any intention to be bound until execution of such document."), affd mem., 697 F.2d
289 (2d Cir. 1982); Ashton v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F. Supp. 1009 (E.D.N.Y. 1965)(Court found
no contract for dealership franchise when application said agreement must be signed and there
was no signed agreement).
68. R.G. Group. Inc., 751 F.2d at 75-76; Winston, 777 F.2d at 81-84; Chrysler Capital
Corp., 697 F. Supp. at 801-03. Partial performance sends an unmistakable signal that a party
believes a contract exists. In addition, acceptance of such performance signals that the accepting
party knows a contract was formed. R.G. Group, Inc., 751 F.2d at 75-76; Viacom Int'l Inc. v.
Tandem Prod., Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1264, 1270 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)(Performance for a year is strong
circumstantial proof that the minds of the parties had met on the essential elements and they were
not waiting for formal written instruments.), aff'd, 526 F.2d 523 (2d Cir. 1975).
69. R.G. Group. Inc. 751 F.2d at 75-76; Winston, 777 F.2d at 81-84; Chrysler Capital
Corp., 697 F. Supp. at 801-03. The courts consider "whether there was literally nothing left to
negotiate or settle, so all that remained to be done was to sign what had already been agreed to."
R.G. Group, Inc., 751 F.2d at 76; Municipal Consultants & Publishers, Inc. v. Town of Ramapo,
47 N.Y. 2d 144, 417 N.Y.S.2d 218, 390 N.E.2d 1143 (1979)(The court found a contract even
though the document was not signed, since signing was authorized and was purely for adminin-
strative purposes).
70. R.G. Group, Inc., 751 F.2d at 75-76; Winston, 777 F.2d at 81-84; Chrysler Capital
Corp., 697 F. Supp. at 801-03. Under this fourth factor, the courts examine "whether the agree-
ment concerns those complex and substantial business matters where requirements that contracts
be in writing are the norm rather than the exception." R.G. Group, Inc., 751 F.2d at 76 (The
court found that since the franchise agreement between the parties was to "run for 20 years and
cover detailed matters of capital structure for the franchises, purchase and development of real
estate, construction of stores, trade secrets, and transfers on default, it would be unusual for the
transaction not to require a written agreement." In addition, the transaction involved an initial
investment of two million dollars).
In Reprosystem, B.V. v. SCM Corp., 727 F.2d 257, 262-63 (2d Cir. 1984), the proposed deal
involved a sale of six companies, incorporated in five different countries. The total sale price was
$4 million. Each company had assets of over $17 million, sales of $40 million, and profits of $4
million. The deal also involved obtaining approval of foreign governments, selling both securities
and assets, and transfering about 1,000 foreign employees. The complexity reflected a practical
business need to record the parties commitments in definitive documents.
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In applying the four-factor analysis, courts do not consider any
single factor as decisive. Each factor merely provides insight into the
parties' intentions.71 The intentions of the parties determine whether
they agreed to bind themselves, with or without a formal agreement.72
Many courts have applied the four-factor analysis and found an en-
forceable preliminary contract.73 In contrast, other courts have applied
the four-factor test and found no binding agreement existed. 4
The second type of binding preliminary agreement is one which
expresses mutual commitment to a contract on agreed major terms,
while recognizing the existence of open terms that remain to be negoti-
ated.75 The open terms that remain to be negotiated must be within
"the usual and customary terms" of a particular transaction. 76  Al-
In Chrysler Capital Corp., 697 F. Supp. at 795, the court found that the transaction to
purchase up to 15 Days Inn Hotels involving $37,500,000 would usually close without signed and
executed copies of such commitment.
71. R.G. Group, Inc., 751 F.2d at 75; Winston, 777 F.2d 78; Reprosystem, B.V., 727 F.2d
257; Chrysler Capital Corp., 697 F. Supp. 794.
72. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
73. V'soske v. Barwick, 404 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1968)(Court found that correspondance be-
tween prospective buyer and seller of business created a binding contract despite disagreement
over the term "audited net worth."); Pyle v. Wolf Corp., 354 F. Supp. 346 (D. Or. 1972)(Court
found binding agreement where the parties agreed to an oral settlement with a discussion of a
written agreement).
74. R.G. Group, Inc., 751 F.2d at 69 (Despite negotiation and a handshake deal, the court
found the parties only intended to be bound by a written agreement.); Reprosystem, B.V., 727
F.2d at 257 (Court found no intention to be bound before the formal contract even though the
parties made an agreement in principle.); Winston, 777 F.2d at 78 (Court found no binding agree-
ment although four drafts of an agreement were passed between the parties and funds relating to
the agreement were passed in escrow.); Chrysler, 697 F. Supp. at 794 (Despite Chrysler deposit-
ing funds with Southeast pending negotiation of the commitment letter, the court found no bind-
ing agreement. However, the court admonished Southeast for abusing its relationship with
Chrysler).
While all of the noted cases utilized the four-factor analysis, each case was dependent on its
own facts and on the parties' intentions. Therefore, although the courts employed uniform guide-
lines, the ultimate resolution rested on the unique circumstances surrounding each case. See supra
notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
75. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n v. Butler, 626 F. Supp. 1229, 1232 (S.D.N.Y. 1986);
Teachers Ins. and Annuity Ass'n, 670 F. Supp. at 498; Knapp, supra note 36, at 676.
76. Teachers Ins. and Annuity Ass'n, 670 F. Supp. at 497. For instance, usual and custom-
ary terms in the lending business are "representations and warranties, closing conditions, other
covenants, events of default and remedies, and requirements for the delivery of financial state-
ments . I..." d  at 496. The U.C.C. additionally takes the position that when the parties to a
transaction leave out terms of price, delivery, payment terms, or quantity, the gaps are filled in
one of four ways. J. WHITE AND R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-3 (3d ed. 1988).
The open terms can be supplied by examining the prior course of dealing between the parties
(U.C.C. § 1-205(1)), by examining the custom in the industry (U.C.C. § 1-205(2)), or by examin-
ing the course of performance (U.C.C. § 2-208(1)). The U.C.C. provides the gap-fillers for terms
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though it might seem a binding agreement could not result where there
are open terms, that is not necessarily the case." The "parties can bind
themselves to a concededly incomplete agreement in the sense that both
accept a mutual commitment to negotiate in good faith." 8 The good
faith negotiation should result in a final agreement within the scope of
the preliminary agreement. 79 "Each party actually regards himself as
not completely bound, but rather committed to the deal and bound to
the extent actual agreement is reached."8
The good faith contract case occurs when the parties have failed to
achieve "contract" status only because they did not reach a bargain
complete and final enough to be legally recognized and enforceable.
81
However, the courts can look to the parties' intentions to enforce the
precontractual agreement to negotiate in good faith even though the
actual terms to the deal remain to be negotiated. 2 In other words, "the
capable of being ascertained. J. WHITE AND R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-3 (3d
ed. 1988). Generally the U.C.C. sections look to what is commercially reasonable. U.C.C. § 2-308
(absence place of delivery); U.C.C. § 2-305 (open price); U.C.C. § 2-309 (absence of specific time
for delivery).
The gap-fillers suggest that for the open terms that are usual to a contract in a particular
business, the best method of supplying the terms is looking at the standard in that particular
business. WHITE AND SUMMERS, supra, § 3-3. However, if the parties have not reached agreement
on the usual terms nor the material terms, then the gap-fillers would not serve to hold the contract
together. Teachers Ins. and Annuity Ass'n, 670 F. Supp. at 497. White and Summers note that
freedom of contract is the rule rather than the exception, and where the U.C.C. is silent, common
law principles under § 1-103 apply. Therefore, if the material terms are not the usual terms of the
industry or business, then they are not capable of being supplied by the gap-fillers. Thus the
contract is incomplete and unenforceable. WHITE AND SUMMERS, supra, at 19.
77. See supra note 74.
78. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 670 F. Supp. at 498.
79. Id. at 497. See also Candid Prods., Inc. v. International Skating Union, 530 F. Supp.
1330, 1333-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
80. Knapp, supra note 36, at 681. A duty to negotiate in good faith does not require an
automatic duty to approve the final deal. A/S Apothekernes Laboratorium v. I.M.C. Chem., 873
F.2d 155, 159 (7th Cir. 1989). A party's rights under an agreement to negotiate in good faith
consist of demanding that his counterparty negotiate the open terms in good faith with the ulti-
mate goal of reaching a final contract. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 670 F. Supp. at 498. The
good faith "obligation does not guarantee that the final contract will be concluded as good faith
differences in the negotiation of open issues may prevent reaching a final contract." Id.
81. Knapp, supra note 36, at 676.
82. Channel Home Centers, Grace Retail v. Grossman, 795 F.2d 291 (3d Cir. 1986). The
court determined the parties' intentions by examining the letter of intent and the circumstances
surrounding the letter. Finding that the letter of intent, signed by both parties, induced the tenant
to proceed with leasing the store, the court further noted that the letter provided that the lessor
would take the store off of the rental market and negotiate the lease until finalized. Through such
language, the court held lessor's inducement to be an unequivocal promise, thereby imposing a
duty to negotiate the lease in good faith. Id. at 298-99. Many jurisdictions which have considered
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parties are bound to try in good faith to reach some agreement and not
to withdraw from the proposed agreement for any reason other than
the eventual failure to reach such agreement."83
In determining whether the parties intended to be bound by an
agreement to negotiate in good faith, the courts look to:84 (1) the lan-
guage of the agreement; (2) the context of the negotiations; (3) the
existence of open terms; (4) partial performance; and (5) the necessity
of putting the agreement in final form, which would be indicated by
examining the customary form of such transactions."
Obligating parties to negotiate in good faith prevents one party
from renouncing the deal, halting negotiations, or insisting on terms
that do not conform to the preliminary agreement.86 For instance, in
Teachers, Tribune was found to have breached a preliminary agree-
ment to bargain in good faith by insisting on offset accounting as a
precondition to the loan.8 7 Teachers presented evidence that Tribune's
insistence on the additional condition was motivated by changing mar-
ket conditions (lower interest rates) which made the initial deal
unfavorable. 88
In some instances, the scope of the obligation to bargain in good
faith can be as simple as negotiating in good faith until there is disa-
greement.89 The duty to negotiate in good faith does not confer an au-
tomatic duty to approve the final deal.90 In fact, there is no guarantee
that even with the parties' good faith efforts to negotiate a final con-
tract will result.91
the issue of whether an agreement to negotiate in good faith meets the test of enforceability have
held that such an agreement, otherwise meeting the requirements of a contract, is an enforceable
contract. E.g., Thompson v. Liquichema, 481 F. Supp. 365, 366 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); Reprosystem,
B.V., 727 F.2d at 264; Arnold Palmer Golf Co. v. Fuqua Indus., 541 F.2d 584 (6th Cir. 1976);
Itek Corp. v. Chicago Aerial Indus., Inc., 248 A.2d 625 (Del. 1968).
83. Knapp, supra note 36, at 681.
84. Arcadian Phosphates, Inc. v. Arcadian Corp., 884 F.2d 69, 72 (2d Cir. 1989); A/S
Apothekernes Laboratorium, 873 F.2d 155; Itek Corp. v. Chicago Aerial Indus., Inc., 248 A.2d
625 (Del. 1968).
85. Arcadian Phosphates, Inc., 884 F.2d 69; Itek Corp., 248 A.2d at 629. In Itek the court
held that to make the determination of whether an agreement to negotiate in good faith was in
fact made, the trier of fact must look to "the circumstances surrounding the negotiations and the
actions of the principals at the time and subsequent to the formation of such agreement." Id.
86. A/S Apothekernes Laboratorium, 873 F.2d at 158.
87. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 670 F. Supp. at 496.
88. Id. at 501.
89. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
90. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
91. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 670 F. Supp. at 491.
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Many courts which have faced the issue of enforcing an agreement
to negotiate in good faith have had some guidance into the parties' in-
tentions via a "letter of intent.""2 Often a letter of intent or the com-
mitment letter has been dispositive of the case. However, such letters
are not necessarily controlling. 3
In analyzing the binding quality of the good faith agreement, the
courts place just as much importance on the facts of a particular situa-
tion as they do in the formal contract contemplated agreements. 4 The
preliminary agreement to negotiate in good faith can be distinguished
from the formal contract contemplated. The formal contract contem-
plated binds both parties to their ultimate contractual objective despite
the fact that the agreement will be memorialized at a later date.95 In
contrast, the good faith agreement commits the parties to negotiate the
92. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
93. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 670 F. Supp. at 497. Goodstein Constr. Corp. v. City of
New York, 502 N.Y.S. 2d 994, 494 N.E. 2d 99 (1986)(The court found that designation agree-
ments which selected plaintiff to exclusively negotiate the terms and conditions of a land disposi-
tion agreement placed a duty on defendant to cooperate with plaintiff in negotiating the agree-
ment for the eventual submission and approval of the agreement by the Board of Estimate.); Itek
Corp. v. Chicago Aerial Indus., Inc., 248 A.2d 625 (Del. 1968)(The court found a binding agree-
ment to negotiate in good faith where the parties' exchange of letters in reference to a stock
distribution plan obligated the parties to make every reasonable effort to agree on a formal con-
tract.); Channel Home Centers, Grace Retail v. Grossman, 795 F.2d 291 (3rd Cir. 1986)(The
court found a letter of intent between the parties obligated the parties to negotiate in good faith.
The letter of intent stated that the lessor would take his store off the market and only negotiate
the leasing transaction to completion with lessee.); Thompson v. Liquichimica of Am., Inc., 481 F.
Supp. 365 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)(The court found a binding agreement to negotiate in good faith where
a letter signed by both parties' representatives obligated the parties to use their best efforts to
reach an agreement to sell Liquichemica of America, Inc. to Thompson. The parties bound them-
selves in consideration for Thompson's temporary waiver of rights under an earlier contract.);
Runnemede Owners, Inc. v. Crest Mortgage Corp., 861 F.2d 1053 (7th Cir. 1988) (The court
found that a qualified letter of commitment which outlined the terms of a proposed loan only
bound defendant to consider lending plaintiff money. The letter was not an unqualified promise
that consideration would lead to the desired financial help.); Arcadian Phosphates, Inc. v. Arca-
dian Corp., 884 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1989) (The court held a memorandum between the parties did
not amount to a binding agreement due to the fact that Arcadian Corporation, by the language of
the letter, could not have believed itself bound to any agreement. The memo outlined the purchase
price, timing and amounts of payments, fixed assets to be purchased, and a closing date. The
memo further outlined a framework of negotiations for the purchasing of Arcadian's finished
product inventory. However, the memo was vague on other terms such as how the transaction was
to be financed, inventory transfer, charges for SG & A expenses and insurance coverage.); Feld-
man v. Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 850 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1988) (The court found that express lan-
guage in the letter of intent negated any inference that the letter was a binding agreement. In-
stead, the express language stated the obligations and rights of the parties should be set forth in
the definitive agreement executed by the parties.).
94. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
95. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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open terms in good faith in an effort to reach the contractual objectives
stated in the framework of the preliminary agreements.96 In both types
of agreements the courts attempt to enforce parties' intentions through
a detailed examination of the unique facts of the case. 97
In Shearson Lehman CMO, Inc. v. TCF Banking and Savings the
court analyzed the agreement between the Shearson vice-president and
TCF's representative as a formal contract contemplated agreement. 8
Therefore, the court utilized the four-factor analysis to examine the
intent of the parties. The first factor considered was whether the parties
expressed an intent to be bound only by written agreement.99 Shearson
asserted that no such intention was expressed between the parties. The
court rejected Shearson's contention, noting that a mutual intent not to
be bound except by writing is conclusively established when, during ne-
gotiations, neither party objects to provisions in the drafts indicating
that the agreement will be valid and binding "when executed and deliv-
ered." 100 The court found that neither party took exception to a similar
clause in the draft purchase agreement. 01 The draft stated that if TCF
agreed with the provisions in the draft, it should sign a counterpart and
return it to Shearson "whereupon the Agreement [would] become a
binding agreement."' 02 Therefore, the court found the parties intended
to bind themselves to a written agreement only. 03
The second factor in the analysis concerned partial performance
and acceptance of partial performance.' 0 ' Shearson contended that par-
tial performance was evidenced by purchasing the securities to be used
in the transaction and by delivering to TCF the proposed tombstone
which was returned by TCF with suggested revisions and incorporated
96. Knapp, supra note 36, at 680. The framework of an obligation could be established
through the terms of a letter of intent or through a commitment letter. A/S Apothekernes
Laboratorium v. I.M.C. Chem., 873 F.2d 155, 159 (7th Cir. 1989).
97. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
98. Shearson Lehman CMO, Inc. v. TCF Banking & Say., 710 F. Supp. 67 (S.D.N.Y.
1989). In other words, the court had to determine whether the parties intended to be bound by the
oral agreement with a formalization of that agreement being incidental to the transaction. Id. at
70.
99. Id. See supra note 66.
100. 710 F. Supp. at 70 (citing R.G. Group, Inc., 751 F.2d at 75).
101. Id. at 70-71.
102. Id. at 71.
103. Id.
104. Id. To establish partial performance, Shearson needed to show it conferred something
of value on TCF which TCF accepted. Id.
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into the final draft." 5 The court found that Shearson's act of purchas-
ing securities did not confer a benefit on TCF, but was merely a pre-
paratory act, insufficient to constitute partial performance.'0 Even
though passing the document back and forth costs money for the prep-
aration and revisions which benefitted both parties, the essential char-
acter of the act was preparatory.'
The third factor considered was whether all of the terms were
agreed upon, leaving nothing further to negotiate. 08 The facts of the
deal indicated that TCF agreed to buy a certain quantity of securities
at a stated price, along with specified interest and collateral. 0 9 How-
ever, following a review of the draft private placement agreement, TCF
became concerned about the deal's tax and accounting problems." 0 In
fact, TCF's tax attorneys requested Shearson's attorneys to issue an
opinion stating that the Series G CMO residuals were void of certain
tax problems."' When Shearson's attorneys issued the opinion, TCF's
counsel interpreted the opinion to say just the opposite. Therefore,
Shearson was clearly on notice that these problems had to be resolved
before TCF would agree to purchase the securities." 2
As a result, terms that both parties understood as crucial to the
agreement were still being negotiated and it was clear there had been
no "meeting of the minds.""13 Even though some terms had been
agreed upon, there still was no agreement on all the terms to which
agreement was anticipated. Therefore, there was no binding
agreement.""
The final factor the court considered was whether this was the sort
of agreement that is usually written. 1 5 Shearson asserted that in the
securities industry, the custom was to conclude deals orally rather than
in writing, and that TCF itself thought it was bound by the oral agree-
105. Id. at 71.
106. Id. The preparatory act in Shearson consisted of buying the securties and sending the
tombstone which was only evidence of preparation of the deal-not a part of the deal itself. Id.
Additionally, the act of drafting and marking the tombstone was no more partial performance












ment. 16 In addressing this issue, courts often focus on the complexity
of the proposed transaction to determine whether it would be unusual
for parties to rely on an oral agreement. 7
Even though the securities industry "tends to be an oral busi-
ness," 118 the evidence indicated that each CMO is a fundamentally
unique transaction and that trading CMO residuals is more complex
than trading the CMO bonds themselves. 9 Therefore, trading CMO
residuals is a highly complex transaction-much more complex than
trading in the secondary market.120 Moreover, the transaction was
worth about $21 million. The court reasoned that the requirement that
the agreement be in writing should not be surprising. 121
Shearson offered evidence that TCF also was under the impression
that securities were traded orally. The evidence consisted of a meeting
of the TCF Asset Liability Committee held specifically to discuss the
purchase of the Series G CMO residuals. In this meeting TCF referred
to its current position in the purchase as "committed.' 22 Yet when the
minutes of the meeting were read as a whole, it was clear that the
accounting, legal, and investment departments were expected to review
the purchase before any final decision was made. 23 The term "commit-
ted" indicated an ongoing intent to purchase which was subject to
change rather than reflecting a completed transaction. 24
After analyzing the four factors used to determine whether a con-
tract existed between the parties, the court found that the parties did
not intend contractual obligations until a signed agreement came into
existence. Therefore, there was no binding contract between Shearson
and TCF.'25
In contrast, the court in Teachers found the agreement between
Tribune and Teachers to be a binding agreement to negotiate in good
faith.121 In utilizing the four-factor analysis, the court first considered
whether the parties expressed an intent to be bound only by written
116. Id.
117. Id. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
118. Shearson, Lehman CMO, Inc., 710 F. Supp. at 72. The affidavit of Stanley MeHaffy
suggested that the securities industry is an "oral business." Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 73.
122. Id. at 72.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 73.
125. Id.
126. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 670 F. Supp. at 499.
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agreement."2 7 The court held that language such as "subject to ap-
proval" did not mean the agreement was not binding until such
approval.' 28
The agreement contained express language evidencing an intent to
create a mutually binding agreement. This language did not leave ei-
ther party free to walk away from the deal."2 9 By examining the lan-
guage in the context of the entire agreement and the parties' intentions
in accordance with the negotiations, the court concluded the parties
intended to be bound by an agreement to resolve the open terms in
good faith. 3 °
The second factor the court considered was partial performance.
Although Teachers' loan commitment to Tribune was informal, the
commitment involved a budgeting of funds to be lent out. This reduced
Teachers' net amount considered to be available for new loans.' The
allocation of loan commitment reserved the funds for Tribune's loan
and prevented Teachers from taking advantage of other opportunities
to loan the money. 32 However, the court also noted that "[A] party's
partial performance does not necessarily indicate a belief that the other
side is bound."' 33 "A party may make some partial performance only
to further the chance of closing a transaction it considers
127. Id.
128. Id. at 500. The court noted that the term "subject to approval" is to be considered in
the context of the agreement. The parties recognized that their deal would require further docu-
mentation and negotiation of the open terms. Therefore, the "subject to approval" reservation
made it clear that a party or its board can insist on appropriate documentation and negotiation for
protections which are customary for such transactions. Id.
129. Id. When Tribune signed the commitment letter, it used words such as "accepted and
agreed to." Additionally, Tribune's letter of acceptance began with "attached is an executed copy
of the commitment letter . . . for $76 million loan." Id. at 499. The exchange of letters which
constituted the commitment was full of terms associated with a binding agreement. For example,
one letter required that if Tribune was going to accept the conditions of the letter, a duly author-
ized officer should execute a copy of the letter and return one counterpart. Other language indi-
cated that once Teachers received the counterpart, the agreement would be binding. Id.
130. Id. The court examined the language in the exchange of letters and the commitment
letter to determine if the parties expressed an intent to be bound by an agreement. Id. In addition,
the court found that the parties made a binding agreement on the stated terms, and Teachers'
reservation of right of approval by its board was simply a recognition that various issues remained
open which would require documentation and approval. Id. at 500. Therefore, by combining the
language of the agreements with the parties' intentions to be bound, the court found a binding
agreement to negotiate in good faith. Id. at 499-500.





The third factor the court examined concerned the open terms. 35
Although some of the terms of the agreement were open, the term
sheet attached to the commitment letter covered the major economic
terms.'3 6 The agreement was enforceable even though minor terms re-
mained to be settled.3 Teachers, in keeping with its contractual obli-
gations, asked Tribune to sit down and negotiate in good faith on the
open points. 8'
Finally, the court looked at whether the transaction at issue was
one which is usually committed to writing.'39 The standard the court
applied is whether it is customary in the relevant business community
to give binding force to the type of preliminary agreement at issue.'4 0
Expert testimony established that it is within recognized practices of
the financial community to accept preliminary commitments of this
type as binding.' 4 Tribune failed to establish that the commitment be-
tween Teachers and itself was outside recognized practices." 2
Based on the four-factor test, the court in Teachers found the par-
ties had an agreement to negotiate in good faith.' 3 Ultimately, the de-
termining factor was that the open terms were easily negotiated"' and
immaterial to the overall agreement. 45 Consequently, the court held
that based on a good faith obligation, Tribune could not walk away
134. Id.
135. Id. at 501.
136. Id. The two page term sheet attached to the commitment letter covered the important
economic terms of the loan. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
137. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 670 F. Supp. at 502. The court stated that the com-
mitment letter contained the significant economic terms, and the fact that there was no mention of
the conventional, customary mortgage terms did not render the contract unenforceable. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 503.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. Some preliminary commitments are not binding. Tribune could have established
that the agreement was binding on one side only. For example, if Tribune paid a commitment fee
to bind Teachers, the agreement may have been in the nature of an option to Tribune to decide by
a specified date whether to go ahead with the transaction. In such a case, Teachers would have
paid for its one-sided commitment. These types of preliminary agreements are seen as mere letters
of intent which would leave both sides free to abandon the transaction. Id.
143. Id. at 508.
144. Id. at 501.
145. The two page term sheet to the mortgage sufficiently specified the material terms




from the deal without liability to Teachers.146
Preliminary agreements, which were nonexistent under traditional
contract law principles, have evolved to comport with modern business
transactions. Until fairly recently, the usual type of preliminary agree-
ments the courts analyzed constituted a narrowly defined category. 147
For example, the courts faced problems with agreements between con-
tractors and subcontractors, or insurance companies' "binders" to the
insured.' 48 Currently, however, preliminary agreements constitute a
usual course of conduct between businessmen. 49 Many deals are nego-
tiated orally; the parties negotiate a preliminary agreement on all the
terms which they consider material, and leave the final negotiations
and document drafting to their lawyers or accountants. 50 The reality
of the transaction lies in the fact that the parties carried the deal as far
as they could and then relied on their agents to complete the deal.15'
Nevertheless, the principals may consider themselves bound by the
framework of their agreement.' 52
The Shearson and Teachers decisions reveal a tendency for courts
to hold preliminary agreements binding, despite the fact that all the
essential terms are not completely resolved. The courts will either bind
the parties to a preliminary agreement based on their intent to be
bound (despite lack of formal agreement), or the courts will bind the
parties to an agreement to negotiate open terms in good faith.'53 How-
ever, remaining open terms must be susceptible to negotiation and reso-
lution within a recognizable range of normal business practices before
the courts will impose such a duty. 54
There are two aspects of modern business which have prompted
increased reliance on precontractual agreements. 155 The first is the fact
that commercial transactions are often consummated between parties
of different countries with significantly different cultural and legal sys-
146. Id. at 508.
147. 1 A. CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 30 (1963).
148. Id.
149. Knapp, supra note 36, at 679.
150. Knapp, supra note 36, at 679.
151. Knapp, supra note 36, at 679.
152. Knapp, supra note 36, at 679.
153. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 670 F. Supp. at 498.
154. Id. at 497. Examples of terms which would fall within the recognizable range would be
terms of notice, default, representations and warranties, various grace periods, and closing condi-
tions. Id. at 496.
155. Lake, supra note 51, at 332. See Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A
Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55 (1963).
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tems. 1'" Because of the unfamiliarity with a foreign system, the parties
may be more comfortablereducing the goals of the deal at a relatively
early stage of the negotiations.157 Secondly, modern business transac-
tions are becoming noticeably more complex and involve contracts con-
taining an extensive set of documents."'8 Reviewing and red-lining the
documents, while resolving numerous details, is a lengthy process.
Moreover, the negotiation often involves multiple parties. 59 Therefore,
precontractual agreements with binding moral, if not legal, force would
aid in bringing order to complex transactions."' °
"Legal recognition of preliminary binding commitments serves a
valuable function in the marketplace, especially with standardized
transactions such as loans."' 1 Absent such legal recognition, parties
would spend outrageous amounts of time, money, and resources negoti-
ating every detail of the final contract. Expending time and money
before knowing whether, under the eyes of the law, an enforceable
agreement existed could be risky."6 2 Yet a party not wishing to be
bound during the preliminary stage can protect itself from legal en-
forcement by objecting to language which indicates a "firm commit-
ment" or "binding agreement."'6 3 Therefore, the significance of Teach-
ers and Shearson lies in the, fact that courts are slowly making a
transition toward enforcing the reality of the transaction rather than
the form of the transaction.
While the Shearson court utilized the four-factor analysis test, the
court found no binding agreement. This indicates that even though
there is a willingness to be flexible and examine the realities of the
transaction, the court is still hesitant to enforce an agreement not in
accord with the parties' intentions. In balancing the freedom to negoti-
156. Lake, supra note 51, at 332.
157. Lake, supra note 51, at 332.
158. Lake, supra note 51, at 332. Legal arrangements necessary for large transactions such
as the sale and installation of high technology equipment and infrastructure facilities in less-devel-
oped countries, turnkey projects for the construction of manufacturing facilities, arrangements for
exploration of natural resources, large-scale corporate acquisitions and mergers are neccessarily
quite complicated. Fontaine, Les lettres d'intention dans la negociation des contracts internation-
aux, 3 DROIT ET PRATIQUE Du COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL 73, 76 (1977).
159. Lake, supra note 51, at 332.
160. Fontaine, supra note 158.
161. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 670 F. Supp. at 499. For instance, legal recognition
allows "borrowers and lenders to make plans in reliance upon their preliminary agreements and





ate and enforcement of preliminary agreements to be bound, the court
gave a clear signal that the freedom to negotiate is deeply embedded in
the traditional law of contracts. Therefore, if there is any deviation
from traditional standards, the party attempting to establish the exis-
tence of a binding preliminary agreement must clearly demonstrate
both parties' intentions to be bound.
The result reached in Shearson was fair in that Shearson was
aware TCF would not accept a deal with unfavorable tax and account-
ing consequences. Therefore, the court reached a traditional result in
the case despite the modern analysis. The ultimate factor which swayed
the court was that the terms remaining to be negotiated were of mate-
rial significance. The parties could not continue to negotiate and reach
an agreed-upon result-the deal either had the problems or it did not.
No amount of negotiation could change the end result. 6 Due to the
open material terms and the parties' intentions, the court could not
hold the parties bound to a formal agreement contemplated. Neither
could the court hold the parties to an agreement to negotiate in good
faith, since there was nothing left to negotiate."' 6
In contrast, the court in Teachers reached a "modern result" using
the modern analysis. The court examined the reality of the transaction
and held that the open terms were not of material significance and
were subject to negotiation.1 66 The court refused to follow the tradi-
tional rule that no agreement existed unless there was a "meeting of
the minds" on all essential terms.1 67
In rejecting the traditional rules, the court demonstrated a willing-
ness to employ legal realism.' 68 The terms remaining to be negotiated
were standard terms for a lending agreement rather than material
terms such as amount to be borrowed or method of payment. 6 9 The
court was unwilling to allow Tribune to walk away from the transac-
tion by hiding under the traditional umbrella of "meeting of the
minds."'7 0 Additionally, in holding that the binding agreement between
the parties constituted good faith negotiations, the court furthered a
policy of encouraging parties to work out their differences and ulti-
164. Shearson Lehman CMO, Inc., 710 F. Supp. at 72.
165. Id.
166. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 670 F. Supp. at 501.
167. Id.
168. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
169. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 670 F. Supp. at 508. See supra notes 136-37 and
accompanying text.
170. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 670 F. Supp. at 508.
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mately reach an agreement as opposed to allowing the parties to close
down a deal based on a minor issue.
There is no concrete general standard to determine whether a
party intends to be bound by a preliminary agreement. The analysis is
very fact intensive. Reconciling the results in Shearson and Teachers
requires nothing more than examining the intentions of the parties and
the terms that remain to be negotiated. The similiarity of the cases lies
in the fact that both courts demonstrated a trend toward legal realism.
Janne G. Siegel
